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ABSTRACT
Demand Side Management (DSM) has been recognized for
its potential to counteract the intermittent nature of renewable
energy, increase system efficiency, and reduce system costs.
While the popular approach among academia adopts a social
welfare maximization formulation, the industrial practice in the
United States electricity market compensates customers accord-
ing to their load reduction from a predefined electricity consump-
tion baseline that would have occurred without DSM. This pa-
per is an extension of a previous paper studying the differences
between the industrial & academic approach to dispatching de-
mands. In the previous paper, the comparison of the two models
showed that while the social welfare model uses a stochastic net
load composed of two terms, the industrial DSM model uses a
stochastic net load composed of three terms including the addi-
tional baseline term. That work showed that the academic and
industrial optimization method have the same dispatch result in
the absence of baseline errors given the proper reconciliation of
their respective cost functions. DSM participants, however, and
very much unfortunately, are likely to manipulate the baseline in
order to receive greater financial compensation. This paper now
seeks to study the impacts of erroneous industrial baselines in
a day-ahead wholesale market context. Using the same system
configuration and mathematical formalism, the industrial model
is compared to the social welfare model. The erroneous baseline
is shown to result in a different and more importantly costlier
dispatch. It is also likely to require more control activity in sub-
sequent layers of enterprise control. Thus an erroneous baseline
is likely to increase system costs and overestimate the potential
for social welfare improvements.
NOMENCLATURE
GC subscript for dispatchable (controllable) generators (e.g.
thermal plants)
GS subscript for stochastic generators (e.g. wind, solar
photo-voltaic)
DC subscript for dispatchable (controllable) demand units
(i.e. participating in DSM)
DS subscript for stochastic demand units (i.e. conventional
load)
i index of dispatchable generators
j index of dispatchable demand units
k index of stochastic generators
l index of stochastic demand units
t index of unit commitment time intervals
NGC Number of dispatchable generators
Proceedings of the ASME 2015 9th International Conference on Energy Sustainability 
ES2015 
June 28-July 2, 2015, San Diego, California 
ES2015-49459
1 Copyright © 2015 by ASME
Downloaded From: http://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/pdfaccess.ashx?url=/data/conferences/asmep/86269/ on 04/07/2017 Terms of Use: http://www.asme.org/about-asme/terms-of-use
NDC Number of dispatchable demand units
NGS Number of stochastic generators
NDS Number of stochastic demand units
T Number of unit commitment time intervals
PGCit dispatched power generation at the ith dispachable gen-
erator in the tth time interval
PDC jt dispatched power consumption at the jth dispatchable de-
mand unit in the tth time interval
PˆDC jt forecasted power consumption of the jth dispatchable de-
mand unit in the tth time interval
P˜DC jt baseline power consumption of the jth dispatchable de-
mand unit in the tth time interval
PˆGSkt forecasted power generation at the kth stochastic genera-
tor in the tth time interval
PˆDSlt forecasted power consumption of the lth stochastic de-
mand unit in the tth time interval
PGCi min. capacity of the ith dispatchable generator
PDC j min. capacity of the jth dispatchable demand unit
RGCi min. ramping capability of the ith dispatchable generator
RDC j min. ramping capability of the jth dispatchable demand
unit
PGCi max. capacity of the ith dispatchable generator
PDC j max. capacity of the jth dispatchable demand unit
RGCi max. ramping capability of the ith dispatchable generator
RDC j max. ramping capability of the jth dispatchable demand
unit
W sum of social welfare over all time intervals
CGCi cost of the ith dispatchable generator
SGCi startup cost of the ith dispatchable generator
DGCi shutdown cost of the ith dispatchable generator
RGCit running cost of the ith dispatchable generator in the tth
time interval
AGCi quadratic cost function coefficient of the ith dispatchable
generator
BGCi linear cost function coefficient of the ith dispatchable
generator
ζGC j cost function constant of the ith dispatchable generator
UDC j demand utility of the jth dispatchable demand unit
SDC j startup utility of the jth dispatchable demand unit
DDC j shutdown utility of the jth dispatchable demand unit
RDC jt running utility of the jth dispatchable demand unit in the
tth time interval
ADC j quadratic utility function coefficient of the jth dispatch-
able demand unit
BDC j linear utility function coefficient of the jth dispatchable
demand unit
ζDC j utility function constant of the jth dispatchable demand
unit
CDC j cost of the jth virtual generator
SDC j startup cost of the jth virtual generator
DDC j shutdown cost of the jth virtual generator
RDC jt running cost of the jth virtual generator in the tth time
interval
ADC j quadratic cost function coefficient of the jth virtual gen-
eration
BDC j linear cost function coefficient of the jth virtual genera-
tion
ξ j cost function constant of the jth virtual generation
wGCit binary variable for the state of the ith dispatchable gen-
erator in the tth time interval
uGCit binary variable for the startup state of the ith dispatch-
able generator in the tth time interval
vGCit binary variable for the shutdown state of the ith genera-
tor in the tth time interval
wDC jt binary variable for the state of the ith dispatchable de-
mand unit in the tth time interval
uDC jt binary variable for the startup state of the jth dispatch-
able demand unit in the tth time interval
vDC jt binary variable for the shutdown state of the jth dis-
patchable demand unit in the tth time interval
ωDC jt binary variable for the state of the jth virtual generation
in the tth time interval
µDC jt binary variable for the startup state of the jth virtual gen-
eration at the beginning of the tth time interval
νDC jt binary variable for the shutdown state of the jth virtual
generation at the beginning of the tth time interval
1 INTRODUCTION
Demand Side Management (DSM) offers a means for cus-
tomers to alter their electricity consumption in response to dy-
namic market prices [1–4], thus providing dispatchable resources
from the demand side in addition to the traditional dispatch-
able generation [5, 6]. DSM has been recognized for its abil-
ity to mitigate the fluctuating effects of renewable energy and
increase bulk electric grid reliability by load shedding during es-
pecially challenging hours [7–9]. The potential benefits of DSM
include increasing system efficiency and reducing system cost
by peak load shaving [10, 11]. Dispatchable demands partici-
pate in meeting the system power balance and reduce the need
for expensive generators with high ramping capability, which are
likely to be idle during off-peak hours, thus reducing the facil-
ity cost of renewable integration [12]. The economic benefits
from load reductions are distributed among the electricity supply
side, load reducing customers and non-load-reducing customers
[13–15]. In the US electricity market, Independent System Oper-
ators (ISOs) and Reliability Transmission Organizations (RTOs)
advocate DSM programs to lower market prices, reduce price
volatility, improve customer options, and increase price elastic-
ity in both wholesale & retail markets [16]. Several industrial
DSM programs are active as a result of the recent deregulation of
electricity markets [17–21].
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The industrial and academic research on DSM has ad-
dressed the maximization of customer utility, the minimization
of customer discomfort, and the stabilization of electricity prices
[22–28]. The industrial and academic literature propose different
methods and goals for DSM implementations. The most adopted
method among academic researches is to maximize the net ben-
efit from electricity consumption and generation [25,27–30]. On
the other hand, industrial practice in the US electricity market
uses historical data to predict a baseline of the electricity con-
sumption that would have occurred without DSM [31–33]. Load
reductions from this predefined baseline are treated as “virtual
generation” and compensated accordingly [18, 19, 34–37].
A recent paper has numerically shown that despite having
dissimilar optimization programs, these two methods yield the
same dispatch result provided that 1.) the utility function of dis-
patchable demand and the cost function of virtual generation are
properly reconciled and 2.) the industrial baseline is the same
as the forecast for the dispatchable demand [38]. While the first
condition is likely achievable the second is not. Firstly, the meth-
ods of determining the load forecast and industrial baseline are
fundamentally different. While the load forecast is calculated a
day in advance based upon sophisticated methods [39], the for-
mulae for baseline are much more basic and determined months
in advance [16,40–43]. Indeed, it is conceivable that a baseline is
set and then the demand side participant makes (static) long-term
energy efficiency improvements and then is compensated for the
now guaranteed “load-reduction”. As several authors note, the
baseline itself is subject to manipulation because DSM partici-
pants have greater awareness of their facilities than the regulatory
agencies charged with estimating the baseline [44,45]. While the
errors associated with the baseline have often been a part of pol-
icy discussions [44], they have not been rigorously studied. This
paper aims to rigorously study the effects of an erroneous indus-
trial baseline in a day-ahead wholesale market context in terms
of dispatch level, social welfare and system cost. Using the same
system configuration and mathematical formalism, the dispatch
result from industrial model is compared to that from the social
welfare model in the presence of baseline errors.
The remainder of this paper develops in five sections. Sec-
tion 2 summaries highlights from both the academic literature
and industrial documents, with emphasis on the sources of errors
associated with industrial baselines. In Section 3, the mathemat-
ical formulation for the social welfare and industrial methods of
unit commitment with dispatchable demands are reconciled. The
test case and methodology are presented in Section 4. Section 5
presents and discusses the results and conclusions from the case
study for social welfare model and industrial model with an er-
roneously high baseline. The paper concludes in Section 6.
2 Background
This section provides highlights from the social welfare
method often used in academia as well as the virtual generation
method implemented in industry.
2.1 Academic Literature
The demand side management dispatch schedule is jointly
determined by suppliers and customers [25]. The simplest form
of social welfare maximization is often mentioned in power sys-
tems textbooks [46] and commonly used in academic research.
Assuming an economic dispatch context, the social welfare is
defined as the net benefit from electricity consumption and gen-
eration [46]:
SW (PG,PD) =
m
∑
j=1
U j(PD j)−
n
∑
i=1
Ci(PGi) (1)
where U and C represent the demand utility and the generation
cost, PD and PG represent the individual power demand and gen-
eration levels, and m and n represent the number of demand and
generator units respectively. The system is subject to power bal-
ance constraint which in the simple case is assumed to have zero
transmission loss [46].
n
∑
i=1
PGi =
m
∑
j=1
PD j (2)
2.2 Industrial Practice
In the industrial implementation, each curtailment service
provider (CSP) is administratively assigned an electricity con-
sumption baseline by adjusting historical data from the previous
year to consider several considerations of the current year such as
offset in the day of week [16]. In a hybrid electricity market, the
CSP can participate in any of several wholesale energy markets.
The Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market (DASR) is one of
these. Here, generation suppliers, load serving entities, and CSPs
bid together [47], and the ISOs/RTO simultaneously allocates the
dispatchable resources and determines the wholesale electricity
price such that the total costs of dispatchable generation and vir-
tual generation are minimized [37]. Load reductions accepted in
day-ahead bidding are penalized for failing to commit [14].
While very much discouraged, customers have an implicit
incentive to surreptitiously inflate the administrative baseline for
greater compensation. For example, the customers can artifi-
cially increase their electricity consumption when baselines are
being evaluated [44]. Customers who anticipate to reduce loads
regardless of DSM are also more likely to be attracted to par-
ticipate [44]. Another example is customers having multiple fa-
cilities shift loads between facilities to create false load reduc-
tions [44]. Successful baseline manipulation may cause genera-
tion relocation and inefficient price information [44].
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3 Mathematical Models
This section describes the mathematical formulation for the
social welfare and industrial virtual generation models. For con-
sistency of research methodology, the provided models are the
same as those in the prequel to this work [38].
3.1 Social Welfare Maximization
Unlike the economic dispatch model in Section 2.1, the unit
commitment problem in this work schedules the dispatchable re-
sources over multiple time intervals and determines their states
during each time interval. The model also adds stochastic gen-
eration (i.e. renewable energy) and stochastic demand (i.e. con-
ventional load) to the optimization program. These are taken
as fixed exogenous quantities whose costs and utilities are in-
dependent from dispatch decisions and which must be balanced
by dispatchable generation and demand units. The goal of the
optimization remains to maximize social welfare over all time
intervals. The objective function of social welfareW is given by
Equation (3) [38]:
W =
T
∑
t=1
[
NDC
∑
j=1
UDC j(PDC jt)−
NGC
∑
i=1
CGCi(PGCit)
]
(3)
where both the generation cost CGCi and demand utility UDC j
are composed of a startup, a shutdown, and a running component
shown in Equation (4) and Equation (5) [38].
∀i = 1, ...,NGC, j = 1, ...,NDC,∀t = 1, ...,T :
CGCi(PGCit) =
uGCit(SGCi)+ vGCit(DGCi)+wGCit [RGCi(PGCit)]
(4)
UDC j(PDC jt) =
uDC jt(SDC j)+ vDC jt(DDC j)+wDC jt
[
RDC j(PDC jt)
] (5)
where the running cost for generators RGCit and running utility
for demands RDC jt are modeled as quadratic functions to de-
scribe the change in marginal costs and marginal utilities with
increasing level of dispatchable generation and dispatchable de-
mand respectively [38]:
RGCi(PGCit) = AGCi(PGCit)2+BGCi(PGCit)+ζGCi
RDC j(PDC jt) = ADC j(PDC jt)2+BDC j(PDC jt)+ζDC j
(6)
The social welfare maximization is subject to several constraints:
• system power balance in Equation (7),
• capacities of the dispatchable generators and demand
units in Equation (8 & 9),
• ramping limits of the dispatchable generators and demand
units in Equation (10 & 11),
• the logical relations for the dispatchable generators & de-
mand units in Equations (12 & 13) [38].
∀t = 1, ...,T
NGC
∑
i=1
PGCit −
NDC
∑
j=1
PDC jt =
NDS
∑
k=1
PˆDSkt −
NGS
∑
l=1
PˆGSlt (7)
∀t = 1, ...,T, ∀i = 1, ...,NGC
wGCit ∗PGCi ≤ PGCit ≤ wGCit ∗PGCi (8)
∀t = 1, ...,T, ∀ j = 1, ...,NDC
wDC jt ∗PDC j ≤ PDC jt ≤ wDC jt ∗PDC j (9)
∀t = 1, ...,T, ∀i = 1, ...,NGC
RGCit = PGCit −PGCi(t−1)
RGCi ≤ RGCit ≤ RGCi
(10)
∀t = 1, ...,T, ∀ j = 1, ...,NDC
RDC jt = PDC jt −PDC j(t−1)
RDC j ≤ RDC jt ≤ RDC j
(11)
∀t = 1, ...,T, ∀i = 1, ...,NGC
wGCit = wGCi(t−1)+uGCit − vGCit (12)
∀t = 1, ...,T, ∀ j = 1, ...,NDC
wDC jt = wDC j(t−1)+uDC jt − vDC jt (13)
3.2 Industrial Practice: Cost Minimization with De-
mand Baseline
The industrial unit commitment model schedules all dis-
patchable resources like the social welfare model, but is different
in that it minimizes the total cost of dispatchable and virtual gen-
eration over all time intervals of the SCUC period as shown in
Equation (14) [38]. The cost of virtual generation is defined as
the compensation paid to the customers for reducing their con-
sumption from a predefined demand baseline.
T
∑
t=1
[
NGC
∑
i=1
CGCi(PGCit)+
NDC
∑
j=1
CDC j(P˜DC jt −PDC jt)
]
(14)
where the costs of the dispatchable generation has been defined
in Equation (4) and the costs of dispatchable demand shown in
Equation (15) also have startup, shutdown, and running cost [38].
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∀ j = 1, ...,NDC,∀t = 1, ...,T
CDC j(P˜DC jt −PDC jt) =
µDC jt(SDC j)+νDC jt(DDC j)+ωDC jt
[
RDC j
] (15)
The running cost mirrors that of the dispatchable generation and
is modeled as a quadratic function of virtual generation or the
load reduction from the baseline [38].
∀ j = 1, ...,NDC,∀t = 1, ...,T
RDC j(P˜DC jt −PDC jt) =
ADC j(P˜DC jt −PDC jt)2+BDC j(P˜DC jt −PDC jt)+ξDC j
(16)
The total cost minimization is subject to the same system power
balance constraint in Equation (7), capacity limits in Equations
(8 & 17), ramping limits in Equations (10 & 11), and logical
constraints in Equations (12 & 18) for dispatchable generators
and dispatchable demands.
∀ j = 1, ...,NDC,∀t = 1, ...,T
ωDC jt ∗ P˜DC jt −PDC jt ≤ P˜DC jt −PDC jt
P˜DC jt −PDC jt ≤ ωDC jt ∗ P˜DC jt −PDC jt
(17)
∀ j = 1, ...,NDC,∀t = 1, ...,T
wDC jt = uDC j(t−1)+uDC jt − vDC jt (18)
3.3 Model Reconciliation
The virtual generation cost function in the industrial model
is reconciled with the utility function of the corresponding dis-
patchable demand unit such that the loss in utility in the SW
model is equal to the increase in virtual generation cost. The eco-
nomics rationale for this is that the customers are only willing to
cut down electricity consumption if their marginal loss in utility
is subsidized by the marginal cost in virtual generation [38].
∀ j = 1, ...,NDC
−UDC j(PDC j)+UDCi(PDC j +δPDC j) =
CDC j(P˜DC j−PDC j)−CDC j(P˜DC j−PDC j−δPDC j)
(19)
Rearranging quadratic and linear terms in Equation (19) yields
Equation (20) [38]. It shows that the cost function of load reduc-
tion is dependent on the choice of baseline.
∀ j = 1, ...,NDC
A j =−A j
B j = 2∗A j ∗ P˜DC j +B j
(20)
That the stochastic net load in the social welfare and in-
dustrial DSM models are different is an important observation
[38]. In the social welfare model, it is composed of two terms
NDS
∑
k=1
PˆDSkt−
NGS
∑
l=1
PˆGSlt . In the industrial model, it is composed of the
same two terms plus the baseline
NDS
∑
k=1
PˆDSkt−
NGS
∑
l=1
PˆGSlt +
NDC
∑
j=1
P˜DC jt .
In the case where the industrial baseline is subject to gaming, it
is reasonable to conclude that the stochastic net load line in the
industrial DSM model is more error prone than its social welfare
counterpart.
The two models are now ready to be compared in the pres-
ence of baseline errors with a specific case.
4 Case Study Methodology
The case study uses the same test case as the prequel to this
work [38]. It consists of a day-ahead unit commitment simula-
tion in a wholesale market for both the social welfare and indus-
trial DSM methods. For fairness of comparison, the two models
use the same system configuration and data. The results are stud-
ied in terms of dispatched energy resources, resulting social wel-
fare, and total system costs. Data is drawn from the Reliability
Test System(RTS)-1996 [50, 51] and the Bonneville Power Ad-
ministration (BPA) website [48, 49]. The following subsections
describe the simulation parameters in detail.
4.1 Time Scale
In the study of a day-ahead UC program, a 1-hour time in-
terval is chosen for a total time span of 24 hours.
4.2 Stochastic Generation, Stochastic Demand, & De-
mand Baseline
The stochastic generation in this case is the wind genera-
tion. Only the wind generation is necessary in the power balance
constraint equation. It is drawn from the wind forecast data pub-
lished on the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) website
for May 12, 2013 [49]. The data was scaled up to 1.6 times of
its value. The raw data for the load forecast has a sampling res-
olution of 5 minutes and was down sampled by taking hourly
averages. The resulting numbers are provided in Table 1.
Similarly, the stochastic demand is taken as the conventional
load. Its aggregated value is drawn from the BPA load repository
for the same day [48], scaled by the same factor, and downsam-
pled to an hourly resolution. The resulting numbers are provided
in Table 1 and only apply to the demand side units not participat-
ing in the DSM program.
For the sake of simplicity, a dispatchable demand unit was
assumed to exist on each bus. This work sets the true baseline to a
time-invariant value equal to 9.6% of the peak demand published
for that bus in the RTS-1996 test case. Furthermore, this work
assumes this error-free baseline is equal to the maximum capac-
ity of the dispatchable demand unit in the social welfare model.
P˜DC j = PDC j. In the industrial model, the erroneous baseline was
set to 120% of its true value to emphasize its impact. This has the
implicit effect of allowing demand units to have a maximum load
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TABLE 1. Stochastic Demand and Generation Levels in MW [48, 49]
Hour of the Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Load Forecast 05/15/2013 (MW) 8347 8036 7795 7691 7711 7827 7994 8487 9186 9515 9626 9648
Wind Forecast 05/15/2013 (MW) 3163 2528 2518 2861 3037 2878 3231 3576 3320 3242 3471 3335
Hour of the Day 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Load Forecast 05/15/2013 (MW) 9679 9618 9594 9621 9657 9701 9728 9753 9927 9753 9132 8498
Wind Forecast 05/15/2013 (MW) 3343 3623 4009 4522 4716 5028 4360 4253 3412 2421 2136 2160
TABLE 2. Dispatchable Generator Parameters [50, 51]
NGC 72
Unit Type Generator Index PGCi
(MW)
PGCi
(MW)
RGCi
(MW/MI)
RGCi
(MW/MI)
ζGCi
($)
BGCi
($/MW)
AGCi
($/MW 2)
SGCi
($)
DGCi
($)
U12 16,17,18,19,20,49,50,51,52,53,82,83,84,85,86 12 2.4 1 -1 37.8 26.8 10 874 0
U20 01,02,05,06,34,35,38,39,67,68,71,72 20 4.0 3 -3 163.3 39.2 10 115 0
U76 03,04,07,08,36,37,40,41,69,70,73,74 76 15.2 2 -2 151.2 13.5 3 1401 0
U100 09,11,42,44,75,77 100 20.0 7 -7 312.8 21.7 0.1 5750 0
U155 21,22,31,32,54,55,64,65,87,88,97,98 155 31.0 3 -3 210.4 11.0 0.1 611 0
U197 45,46,47,78,79,80 197 39.4 3 -3 315.1 21.9 0.01 10189 0
U350 33,66,99 350 70.0 4 -4 181.0 11.0 0.01 4500 0
U400 23,24,56,57,89,90 400 80.0 20 -20 343.7 5.6 0.01 4700 0
TABLE 3. Dispatchable Demand Unit Parameters
index PDC j (MW) RDC j (MW/h) RDC j (MW/h) ζ ($) B j ($/MW) A j ($/MW 2) SDC j ($) DDC j ($)
j 0 PDC j/1.6 -PDC j/1.6 0 112.5 -0.5 0 0
reduction (capacity) of 120% as that found in the social welfare
model.
4.3 Dispatchable Generation & Dispatchable De-
mands
Dispatchable generators refer to the generation plants that
can be fully controlled. Dispatchable demands come from the
DSM participants and are assumed to be fully controllable with-
out error.
Dispatchable generator parameters are listed in Table 2 [50].
The startup cost is based on hot start. Slack generators, regu-
lating generators and hydro generators do not participate in unit
commitment, and therefore are excluded from the table. The sys-
tem has a total dispatchable generating capacity of 8424 MW
available for day-ahead unit commitment.
Each aggregated dispatchable demand is assumed to occur
at each bus. The utility function coefficients for all the dispatch-
able demand units are assumed to be equal and time-invariant.
They are provided in Table 3. The minimum and maximum ca-
pacity limit of each dispatchable demand unit is assumed to be
zero and 9.6% of the peak load at the corresponding bus. It is as-
sumed that each dispatchable demands needs 96 minutes to fully
ramp between zero and maximum consumption. No load recov-
ery is considered because the customers are assumed to base their
electricity consumption only on the current utility and electric-
ity cost. The startup and shutdown costs have entirely different
physical meanings in the social welfare and industrial DSM mod-
els. For fairness of comparison, the startup and shutdown costs
are neglected (i.e. set to zero) in this case study.
4.4 Computational Methods
The optimization is implemented with MATLAB interfaced
with GAMS. Raw data was imported and processed in MATLAB
and passed onto GAMS. GAMS runs the optimization problem
using CPLEX as the optimization engine since all optimization
problems are mixed integer quadratic convex programs. A rela-
tive tolerance of 10−7 was chosen for all optimization problems
to ensure convergence. It takes approximately 1000 seconds to
run each optimization program on a desktop computer with In-
tel(R) Xeon(R) E5405 @ 2.00GHz processor.
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FIGURE 1. Social Welfare & Industrial DSM Model Unit Commitment with Over Estimated Baseine
5 Results & Discussion
The two demand side management optimization programs
are studied for their dispatch levels, social welfare values, and
total system costs. The industrial DSM program is subjected to
an inflated industrial baseline which is absent from the social
welfare model.
5.1 Dispatch Levels
Figure 1a and 1b show the dispatch levels of the social wel-
fare and industrial optimization respectively. The solid black line
represents the non-participating stochastic demand level. Sub-
tracting the stochastic generation from it gives the magenta line:
the stochastic net load line in the social welfare model. The pur-
ple line in the social welfare model represents the frontier of all
the dispatchable demand units consumed at their maximum level.
The mechanics of the industrial DSM model is entirely dif-
ferent. The solid black line still represents the non-participating
stochastic demand level. The solid yellow line adds the now ar-
tificially inflated dispatchable demand baseline to the black line.
The subtraction of the stochastic generation in green from the
yellow line gives the red line: the stochastic net load in the in-
dustrial DSM model. The sum of dispatchable generation in blue
and the sum of dispatchable demands in purple must meet this
line to achieve power system balance. Interestingly, the magenta
line now represents the frontier of all the virtual generators at
their maximum load reduction (i.e. virtual generation).
Looking at both the social welfare and industrial dispatch
in Figure 1. The dispatched generation line appears to remain
around 7000MW for much of the day. In the meantime, the dis-
patchable demand and virtual generation vary substantially from
nearly zero to approximately 2000MW over the course of the
day. The industrial dispatchable generation (blue line) in Figure
1b becomes fairly constant compared to that from social welfare
model in Figure 1a. This is because the artificially inflated base-
line gives the illusion of dispatchable demand levels that may not
be achievable in reality , thus requiring more subsequent control.
Returning to the social welfare dispatch in Figure 1a, there
is a limit to the ability the DSM can mitigate the sudden loss of
renewable energy. For example, in Hour 22, the high stochastic
netload from low renewable generation must be met by the gen-
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eration, and no dispatchable demands are online. On the other
hand, in Hour 5 &18, all the dispatchable demands are running
at maximum capacity. Without greater DSM participation, the
abundant renewable energy generation are under-utilized.
Industrial DSM dispatch in Figure 1b displays a similar be-
havior during renewable energy down-ramp events. In Hour 22,
while all the virtual generation are running at maximum capac-
ity, the dispatchable generation still needs to rise to meet power
balance. However in Hour 5 & 18, the industrial model shows
that the virtual generation participate in maintaining a relatively
constant dispatchable generation level. This is because the model
assumes higher DSM participation than actually exists.
5.2 Social Welfare
Figure 2 evaluates the social welfare function W for both
simulations. As expected, the hourly social welfare value is high-
est in Hours 17-20 when the stochastic generation is high and
the stochastic net load is low. In contrast, it is lowest in Hours
21-23 when the stochastic generation is low and the stochastic
net load is high. Interestingly, and perhaps unintuitively, the in-
dustrial model with artificially high baseline results in “higher”
social welfare values. Because the virtual generators are starting
from the inflated baseline, their marginal costs accumulate more
rapidly than if they had started from the true baseline. As a result,
they end up demanding more as measured from zero. This arti-
ficially inflates the social welfare function perhaps beyond what
is achievable. For example, in the case that the virtual genera-
tors are dispatched between 0 and 20% of the baseline, then they
are being dispatched to demand more than the original load fore-
cast or correct baseline value. This yields a higher social welfare
value but does not have a basis in reality.
FIGURE 2. Social Welfare Values for the Social Welfare & Industrial
Model
5.3 System Costs
Figure 3 now evaluates the total system cost function in
Equation 14 and compares the results in a similar way. While
the industrial model cost is evaluated using an inflated baseline,
the social welfare model evaluates the total system cost from
an error-free baseline. As expected, the cost from the indus-
trial model is consistently higher than that from the social wel-
fare model because it is compensating for false load reductions.
The total costs for the social welfare and industrial models were
4.45 ∗ 106$ and 5.12 ∗ 106$ respectively. Thus, in this case the
20% error in industrial baseline lead to a 14.9% difference in the
total costs.
FIGURE 3. System Cost in Social Welfare & Industrial DSM Models
6 Conclusion
The divergent approaches to Demand Side Management in
industrial & academic literature have been contrasted in the pre-
quel to this work [38]. The comparison of the two models
showed that while the social welfare model uses a stochastic net
load composed of two terms, the industrial DSM model uses a
stochastic net load composed of three terms including an addi-
tional term for the electricity consumption baseline. It is thus
more prone to error because customers have the potential to ar-
tificially inflate this baseline to gain higher financial compensa-
tion for load reduction. This work has compared the two models
while introducing a 20% error in industrial electricity consump-
tion baseline. The comparison showed that the errors in base-
line lead to different dispatch levels, higher systems costs, and
potentially unachievable levels of social welfare. Furthermore,
the erroneous baselines is also likely to require more control ac-
tivity after commitment in subsequent layers of enterprise con-
trol [52–56].
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